The summer of 2003 is remembered in General Staff headquarters as a somewhat traumatic experience. When the Palestinian factions agreed to a hudna (cease-fire) at the end of June, the Israel Defense Forces viewed it as an opportunity to halt the violent conflict, which was then nearing its third anniversary. The first Palestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), who had been appointed to his post three months earlier, spoke out consistently against terrorism and President George Bush’s road map outlined for the parties a possible route back to the negotiating table and to moving ahead toward an agreement.
In less then two months, however, the cease-fire came crashing down – and the great expectations along with it. Israel blamed Hamas, which had dispatched a suicide bomber to Jerusalem, killing 23 civilians on bus No. 2, and the Palestinian Authority, which had refrained from disarming the terror organizations. But IDF top brass knew this was only part of the story. The closefistedness displayed by Ariel Sharon and Shaul Mofaz, despite army recommendations, on the whole matter of releasing prisoners and placing West Bank towns under Palestinian security jurisdiction obstructed any real chance of progress. The impending death of Yasser Arafat provides Israel with a rare opportunity to fix the mess it made last time – and even with the same partner, in view of the emerging return of Abbas to a position of influence. The IDF’s recommendations to the political echelon will therefore be an expanded edition of its assessments from that summer: A show of generosity and patience, willingness to take certain security risks, and an understanding that, without a partner developing on the Palestinian side, the situation could quickly deteriorate once more. But the clear distinction between the current round and the earlier one, aside from Arafat no longer being in the picture, is of course the timetable dictated by the disengagement plan. The head of the National Security Council, Major General (Ret.) Giora Eiland, hinted last week that the fast pace of the plan’s implementation won’t allow for the recruitment of a Palestinian partner. However, the General Staff apparently believes otherwise. If the pullout can be coordinated with the PA, the army – which in contrast to Sharon is not enchained by the political image of a unilateral maneuver not dependent on Arabs – would certainly be glad of it. Another central question is what the odds are of obtaining a new cease-fire in the near future. That is one of the first moves Abbas and Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala) will work to formulate – and without Arafat, their chances of success appear reasonable. The IDF will have to contribute to this, starting now, by reining in its offensive activity: the assassinations and especially the widescale raids in Gaza Strip cities. If the offensive effort is limited to intercepting „ticking bombs” en route to attacks, that would be an approach acceptable to Palestinians. But even if the PA displays, for the first time, a genuine effort to thwart attacks, it is not the one dictating the final result. It is not at all clear for how long Hamas will be able to afford refraining from activity, even if its leadership (whose hold on operatives in the field has greatly weakened since the elimination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi) thinks this is what public opinion in the territories expects from it. The elements most important to the future of any move to calm matters down are not even situated in the territories. Hezbollah and Iran today finance and guide the vast majority of terror networks in the West Bank and a substantial share of the networks in the Gaza Strip. The fundamental Iranian position throughout the years of conflict ruled out a cease-fire – even a temporary one – with Israel. Now, with Bush elected to a second term, and the increase of assessments in the world media about a joint American-Israeli move to undermine Tehran’s nuclear program and missiles, Iran will have to consider how to proceed: Should it temper its support for Palestinian terror, or rather increase it? BPI-info
